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The proposition propounded by the government may be inherently
invalid.' That the Government recognizes the weakness may be indicated
by its decision to not appeal either of the latter cases which were in
separate Circuits, thus laying the foundation for appeal to the U. S.
Supreme Court to settle a conflict should the Government be successful.
A student of law and legislative processes should gain considerable
from following the continued development of this conflict.
DanielF.Allis
TORTS: IMMUNITY OF FEDERAL OFFICERS AN IMPENETRABLE BARRIER?

"Law should be like death, which spares no one."
Montesquieu.
In the recent case of Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.
1964) the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
the United States District Court's' ruling that the Doctrine of Executive
Immunity applies even though the alleged tortious acts are willful,
malicious and unlawful. In so holding, the court made no new law; rather,
it relied on earlier decisions, although it appears that the Doctrine has
been extended by this decision.
The Doctrine of Executive Immunity grew out of the British Common Law Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, wrote that the King was sovereign and, "Hence it is, that no suit
or action can be brought against the King, even in civil matters, because
no court can have jurisdiction over him."2 British authorities fully support
the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.3

was originally inserted as a relief provision to . . . (allow) full benefit of a loss
from the sale of machinery,.. . Another example is where the proceeds of insurance
on destroyed property exceed the cost of the property. The existing law treats such
gain as ordinary income. The gain or loss resulting from the involuntary conversion
of property into other property or money is also treated as an ordinary gain or loss.
The theft of an article which is insured is an example in point..... (Emphasis
added.)
27 If the jury had found the loss to be an involuntary conversion in the Maurer
case, would the 10th Circuit have declared Reg. § 1,1231-1(e) invalid? Murrah,
C. J.,said: "If the loss had been found to be an involuntary conversion, we would
then be called upon to rule whether the regulation can be allowed to stand in the
face of the plain wording of § 1231." The taxpayer urged in its brief that Reg. §
1.1231-1 (e) should be declared invalid as being in conflict with the express
language of the Code, citing two cases wherein the U. S. Supreme Court held that
regulations "out of harmony with the statute" were mere nullities, and of no force
and effect. (Citations omitted). Brief for Appellants, p. 12, Maurer v. United
States, 284 F.2d 122.
- The Oppenheimer case was decided in Missouri which is in the 8th Circuit,
whereas the Morrison case was tried in Tennessee which is in the 6th Circuit.
133 F.R.D. 31 (N.D. Miss. 1963).
21 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 242.
3See, e.g., F. POLLOCK AND F. W. MAITLAND, 1 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
518 (1923 Edition). See generally, W. S. Holdsworth, A History of Remedies
Against the Crown, 38 L.Q.Rev. 141 (1922).
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In the United States, the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity was first
recognized in 1793, in Chisholm v. Georgia.4 There, the Court decided
that Georgia, as a State, was not sovereign within the meaning of the
Doctrine, and therefore, was not immune from tort liability.Following the Chisholm case, a long line of cases, brought under
almost every theory of tort liability, upheld the United States' Doctrine
of Sovereign Immunity, so that in 1869, the Supreme Court said, "It is
a familiar doctrine of the common law that a sovereign cannot be sued
in his own courts without his consent.""
The Court of Claims, in 1870, held:
It is now judicially ascertained and established that the legal redress given to a citizen of the United States is less than he can have
in almost any government in Christendom, and that the government
holds itself, of nearly all governments, the least amenable to the
law.'
Since the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity was well established in
American jurisprudence, it was but a logical extension to include the
Executive Officer, acting in the performance of his duties. In Spalding
v. Vilas,9 the Supreme Court said, "In exercising the functions of his
office, the head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits
of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives
that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of
an inquiry in a civil suit for damages.""
An executive officer was, under the decision in Spalding, immune
for willful and malicious torts, since his motives could not be questioned,
although his immunity thus afforded was clearly limited to his official
conduct.
Immunity from tort liability, as granted by Spalding, was, from the
language of the decision, limited to the "head of an Executive Department."'" Not until 1959, in Barr v. Mateo, 2 did the Supreme Court
extend the Doctrine to lesser executive officials. There, Justice Harlan,
speaking for the majority, said, "We do not think that the principle
announced in Vilas can properly be restricted to Executive Officers of
cabinet rank, and in fact it never has been so restricted by the lower
federal courts." 3
42 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793).

sWhile the State was held not to be sovereign in this case brought under
federal law, states are sovereign in their own courts. See, e.g., Green v. State,
115 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. 1953) and Mayor, City Council, Bd. of Public Works of
City of Elizabeth v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 72 A.2d 399 (New Jersey,
1950).6
Seee.g., Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 122 (1869), Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907), and Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
571 (1934).
7
The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868) at 154.
8
Brown v. United States, 6 Ct.CI. 171 (1870).
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
l1 Id. at 498.
' Ibid.
12360 U.S. 564 (1959).
73Id. at 572.
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Although Barr extended the Doctrine of Executive Immunity to
lesser executive officers, the immunity so afforded was sharply limited
to actions within the scope of his authority. However, in Gregoire v.
Biddle,4 upon which the majority relies in the Norton case, the court
held that the tortious acts which were alleged to be malicious and unlawful
were within the Doctrine, even if done outside the officer's authority. In
so ruling the court said: "What is meant by saying that the officer must
be acting within his power cannot be more than that the occasion must
be such as would have justified the act, if he had been using his power
for any of the purposes on whose account it was vested in him.""5
In Norton, three plaintiffs brought separate actions against common
defendants, alleging that the defendants had unlawfully and without
probable cause arrested and detained them for twenty-one hours without
charges. During eighteen hours of the detention they were forced to sit
in a rigid position without food or water; they were forced to witness
abuse of other prisoners; they were subjected to assault and battery
committed by the defendants with a billy club or large stick. One of the
plaintiffs, in addition, alleged that the defendants took from him medication which had been prescribed to prevent his lapsing into unconsciousness. Without the medicine he became ill and lost consciousness.
The defendants were: a Deputy United States Attorney General, the
Chief of the Executive Officer of the United States Marshals, the First
Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, and a United States
Marshal. There is no question the defendants were executive officers. The
sole question is whether actions such as those alleged by the plaintiffs
fell within the scope of the defendants' duties.
Implicit in the ruling in Barr v. Mateo, was the requirement that
the tortious act must have been done within "... the sound exercise of
discretionary authority." 6 In Wheeldin v. Wheeler," a 1963 case which
would seem to overrule Gregoire v. Biddle and Barr v. Mateo, the Supreme Court ruled that a congressional investigator who, without authorization, issued and served a subpoena, could not take refuge behind the
Doctrine of Executive Immunity afforded by Barr v. Mateo. The Court
distinguished between defamation cases, such as Barr, and abuse of
process cases, such as Wheeldin. In so ruling, the court said:
There is much discussion in the briefs of Barr v. Mateo .... But
that was a libel action .... And the immunity doctrine of that case
and Howard v. Lyons ... , upon which the Court of Appeals rested,
is not relevant here, for, as the Solicitor General has conceded,
under the allegations of the complaint respondent Wheeler was not
acting sufficiently within the scope of his authority to bring the
doctrine into play. 8
9
the United States Court of Appeals for the
In Hughes v. Johnson,"
Ninth Circuit said, as dicta,
14177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).

IS1d. at 581.
16360 U.S. at 575.
17 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
111d. at 650-51.

19305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962).
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The question is whether a search without warrant and unsupported
by arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, can be said to fall within the scope of the
official duties of these appellees. In our view, it cannot, and
accordingly immunity does not extend to such conduct?0
If the allegations of the plaintiffs are true in the Norton case,
the defendants seem to have been outside the scope of their authority,
and therefore, under the seemingly controlling language in Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, liable for their tortious conduct.
Although Wheeldin would appear to have settled the law in this
area, the court, in deciding Norton, adopted a lengthy quotation from
the earlier case of Gregoire v. Biddle:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact
guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for
any other personal motive not connected with the public good,
should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if
it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty,
it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing
so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded
until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the
innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching
discharge of their duties?'
From this language it appears that no matter how clear and convincing the evidence of malice may be, federal officers are immune from
tort liability.
In the light of the Norton case, it is interesting to examine a case
decided exactly one year previously by the same court. In Nesmith v.
Alford,' the defendants, local police officials, arrested and caused the
plaintiffs to be prosecuted for disorderly conduct. After deciding that
there could have been no factual basis for the arrests and prosecutions
and that liability would therefore attach to the defendants, the court said:
But liberty is at an end if a (local) police officer may without
warrant arrest, not the person threatening violence, but those who
are its likely victims merely because the person arrested is engaging
in conduct which, though peaceful and constitutionally protected,
is deemed offensive and provocative to settled customs and practices.
When that day comes, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly,
freedom of speech, freedom of religion will all be imperiled.'
The defendants in the Nesmith case were held liable for their
tortious conduct. In comparison with the Norton case, it appears that
the single distinguishing feature is that in Norton the officers charged
were federal officers; in Nesmith they were local police officials.
It is interesting to speculate as to the court's decision had federal
2
1Id. at 70.
21332 F.2d 855, 858 (5th Cir. 1964). For the full quotation see Gregoire v.
Biddle, Supra, note 14, at 581.
22318 F.2d 110 (Sth Cir. 1963).
23id. at 581.
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